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Analyses of English verb meaning often rely on quasi-aspectual operators 
embedded in event structures to explain shared properties across classes.  These operators 
scope over temporally basic meaning elements that make up the idiosyncratic semantic 
core of complex verbs.  While the inventory of operators – or semantic primes – differ 
from proposal to proposal, they are generally presented as a closed class that includes at 
least CAUSE and BECOME, and their presence and location in event structures account 
for several alternation and ambiguity phenomena.  In this study, I investigate a number 
verbs whose decompositions would include only operator(s) and event structure frames 
under most current decompositional lexical theories; in particular, the periphrastic 
causatives (cause, make, etc) and the verbs of becoming (become, get, etc).  I account for 
differences in the selectional behavior of these verbs by positing incorporated meaning 
components beyond the purely aspectual or event structural.  Based in part on regularities 
among corpus collocations, I propose additional meaning distinctions among these verbs 
along the parameters of causal patient complicity, sentiment, and register.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 The aim of this study is to probe the differences in meaning of English change of 
state and causative verbs as reflected in the distribution of their complements.  The 
approach combines intuitions about meaning distinctions in context of use with 
preliminary diagnostic tools for various parameters and semantic features described 
herein.  In particular, I examine collocational patterns for evidence bearing on several 
varieties and subspecies of causation, along with pragmatic and social meaning 
components – specifically sentiment and register – that are potentially encoded in a 
number of English verbs like cause and become.  
 
1.1 PREDICATE DECOMPOSITION 
 
It is common practice in the syntactic and argument-structure motivated traditions 
of lexical semantic research to represent predicate meaning with putatively primitive 
operators in an event structure.  For many predicates, these event structures are enriched 
by the insertion of verb-specific elements of meaning (see e.g. Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin, 1998).  The general approach is illustrated here for ‘get’: 
(1)    ‘John got angry’ 
    [BECOME [ John < ANGRY > ]] 
    get:  [BECOME [x <STATE> ]] 
 
The sentence ‘John got angry’ is represented as the event of the state of John being angry 
(in some referential metalanguage with the “angry” state defined via, e.g., sets of 
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individuals in possible worlds) “coming about.”  This “coming about” relation is 
represented by the BECOME operator.  When the verb ‘get’ (ignoring tense) is abstracted 
from the logical form, the BECOME operator relating an individual and state is its 
contribution to meaning1. 
 Benefits of this representation include its ability to account for entailment 
relations (2) and scope ambiguities (3), as well as providing a simple and intuitive 
framework for the investigation of various alternations (4): 
 
 
(2) a. ‘John made Bill shut the door’ 
   → ‘Bill shut the door’ → ‘The door shut’ 
 
 b. [John CAUSE [Bill CAUSE [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT > ]]]] 
   → [Bill CAUSE [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT > ]]] 
→ [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT >]] 
→ [the-door < SHUT >] 
 
(3) ‘John shut the door again’ 
  (again)[John CAUSE [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT > ]]] 
  [John CAUSE [BECOME (again) [ the-door < SHUT > ]]] 
 
(4) Causative: [John CAUSE [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT > ]]] 
 Inchoative: [BECOME [ the-door < SHUT > ]] 
 Stative: [ the-door < SHUT > ] 
 
 
                                                
1 Lambdas and types are omitted here for perspicuity. 
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In (2), the entailment of Bill shutting the door generated by the sentence ‘John made Bill 
shut the door,’ and the entailment of the event of the door becoming shut, as well as the 
consequence of the door then being in the state of being shut, are all captured as a nested 
embedding of substructures corresponding the sub-events encoded by the sentence.  In 
(3), the so-called ‘repetitive’ versus ‘restitutive’ readings (Beck & Snyder 2001) of ‘John 
shut the door’ – the former the case in which John had shut the door at some time prior to 
the reference time, and the latter being that in which the door had at some time prior to 
the reference time been shut – is represented via a scope ambiguity.  And in (4) the 
causative and inchoative as well as the inchoative and stative alternations are related in 
terms of event complexity, which is iconically represented by predicate decomposition. 
 Despite these virtues, some researchers have questioned the adequacy of 
decompositions as comprehensive models of verb meaning (see Pulman 2005 for 
discussion) and they remain controversial.  One potentially illuminating test of the 
sufficiency of these decompositions is the behavior of verbs whose meaning should 
consist of nothing outside of event structure scaffolding and primes according to event-
structure models of predicates2, without ‘manner’ or other commonly proposed 
idiosyncratic semantic components.  If these verbs differ from one another in their use, it 
could indicate encoded semantic, pragmatic, or social meaning differences beyond that 
suggested by standard decompositional analyses.  These event scaffold verbs, which 
include simple change of state verbs like become, go (bad), and turn (red) and 
periphrastic (or analytic, or syntactic) causatives such as cause, make, and get (him/her 
                                                
2 At least insofar as it is claimed that Bill shut the door → Bill made/caused/forced… the door shut. 
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angry) might be called “semantically primitive” in keeping with the semantic primes 
populating the literature of decompositional verb meaning. 
 
1.2 SELECTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AND VERB MEANING 
 
An examination of the verbs under investigation reveals clear differences in what 
kinds of complements are felicitous for certain verbs and what kinds are disallowed: 
(5) a. It became apparent  a’. *It got apparent 
 b. John got taller   b’. *John came taller 
 c. It came true   c’. *It went true 
 e. He went nuts   e’. ?He became nuts 
 f. It got John interested  f’. *It drove John interested 
 g. It drove Sara crazy  g’. *It let Sara crazy 
 h. Mike let the car rust  h’. *Mike set the car (to) rust 
 i. He set the bird free  i’. ?He got the bird free3 
 
Here, a motivating hypothesis is that differences in complement classes are reflections of 
differences in meaning among these verbs4 that are not represented in event-structural 
analyses.  The present study is an examination of these possible meaning differences and 
an attempt to develop criteria for their expression and selection properties.  
 The report is organized as follows:  In chapter 2, the behavior of causative verbs 
is examined and insights from natural semantic metalanguage and force-dynamic 
                                                
3 This sentence is felicitous with a specific ‘untangle’ meaning. 
4 Pace Jackendoff (1990, 151), “…the lexical causative may include idiosyncratic information as a 
modifier of the CS-function or as selectional restrictions on its arguments; such lexically specific 
information is not available with a general periphrastic causative.” 
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approaches to causation are considered as a means to distinguish periphrastic causatives 
based on the semantic features of causal proximity and patient complicity.  In chapter 3, a 
simple approach to sentiment analysis is pursued and attempts are made to identify verbs 
of becoming and causatives that encode the evaluative stance of the speaker toward the 
resultant state or caused subevent.  Chapter 4 briefly examines register as a further 























 A periphrastic causative is understood here as a verb that “controls a non-finite 
complement clause and [whose constructions] express a causal relation in which the 
occurrence of the effect is entailed” (Gilquin 2010, 1)5.  The precise nature of causation, 
or of a “causal relation,” is not entirely straightforward or easily expressible.  One of the 
more appealing and often repeated definitions of causation is the counterfactual 
(Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973): X caused Y if Y would not have occurred if not for X.  
This can be restricted, and absurdities of distance and time avoided, by appealing to 
causal chains6 and minimal differences between possible worlds (see, e.g., discussion in 
Dowty 1979).  Although this perspective is far from transparent or unproblematic (for 
example, it is not always clear which, if any, world with some particular sufficient 
condition omitted is less different from the actual one than the worlds with some other 
omitted7), counter-factuality will be adopted here as a conceptual heuristic for causation8.  
In particular, the counterfactual notion can be incorporated into a semantic acceptability 
                                                
5 But see footnote 8. 
6 Or, equivalently, a series of Dowty’s (1979, 108) “causal factors.” 
7 Lewis acknowledges the difficulty of this problem: “…the vagueness of over-all similarity will not be 
entirely resolved.  Nor should it be.  The vagueness of similarity does infect causation, and no correct 
analysis can deny it.” (Lewis 1973, 560). 
8 Although much of the following discussion will assume that causation is a relation between an individual 
and a proposition, rather than between propositions, events, or individuals and events, this assumption is 
not crucial and the approach is compatible with the other formulations. 
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judgment by identifying core9 periphrastic causatives by result entailment and consequent 
generation of contradiction when the resultant state or event is negated: 
 
(6) a. #The blast caused the boat to heel, but the boat didn’t heel. 
 b. #John made Bill leave, but Bill didn’t leave. 
 c. Mary begged Bob to marry her, but he didn’t marry her. 
          (adapted from Wolff and Song 2003, 286) 
 
Based on that criterion, the causatives examined here include cause, get, force, make, 
turn, set, drive, and have, plus the exceptional let and allow.  Verbs not considered, 
which are causative but are restricted or specialized in some way, include persuade, 
convince, wreak (havoc, destruction), bring about, give rise, induce, and render.10 
Causation as it is expressed in natural language is not uniform.  In particular, 
English periphrastic causatives are not typically substitutable without an alteration of 
meaning, even when such a substitution results in an acceptable sentence: 
(7) a.  She had him mail the letter. 
 b.  She got him to mail the letter. 
 c.  She made him mail the letter. 
 
Intuitively, the sentences in (7) – in addition to whatever other meaning differences are 
present – represent points on a potential continuum with respect to how cooperative the 
patient is in mailing the letter, with (7a) corresponding to the most cooperative and (7c) 
the least.  In each case, the subject “causes” the patient to mail the letter, but there is 
                                                
9 Included exceptions are the let/allow causative types with sentient patients: “She let him leave, but he 
didn’t leave” (Wolff and Song 2003, 286). 
10 Lead and compel, neglected here in the interest of space, will be treated in future work on the subject. 
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nevertheless a difference in terms of how much (perhaps patient-internal) resistance must 
be overcome to do so.  In the following subsection, intuitions regarding meaning 
differences are explored within Talmy’s (1988, 2000) force-dynamic model of causation.  
These intuitions are further explored and refined in section 2.2 by appealing to the 
framework of Natural Semantic Metalanguage, and finally they are interpreted in terms 
of the semantic parameters of causal proximity and patient complicity. 
 
2.1  FORCE DYNAMICS AND CAUSATION 
 
 
In the domain of cognitive semantics, Leonard Talmy’s (1988, 2000) treatment of 
‘force dynamics’ has been influential as a tool for the analysis of causation.  In his 
presentation of conceptual force dynamics, Talmy (2000) identifies the primary 
conceptual-semantic elements as an agonist (causee) and antagonist (causer).  Each has 
an intrinsic force tendency – either toward motion or rest – and there is a resulting 
balance of strengths, with either the agonist or antagonist as the stronger entity.  
Together, these result in a force interaction outcome of either motion or rest (Talmy 
2000, 414).  This allows him to model not only the causative scenario in terms of 
physical forces, but also to similarly model the notions of prevention and enablement. 
According to Talmy’s models, make, force, get, and have are all examples of 
‘effectuating’ causation, in which the antagonist exerts a more powerful force on the 
agonist than vice-versa, resulting in motion in the direction of the intrinsic force tendency 
of the antagonist.  The verbs make and force differ from get and have in whether the 
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agonist’s intrinsic force tendency is in the opposite direction of the antagonist’s (for make 
and force) or toward rest (for get and have).  The co-categorical pairs might then differ in 
the strength of their agonist – to my intuition, then, the agonist of force is stronger than 
that of make and the agonist of get stronger than have11, but in all cases it is ultimately 
weaker than the antagonist and therefore subject to the direction of its inherent force 
tendency. 
Contrasting with these effectuating causative verbs are the enabling causatives 
like let and allow.  For these verbs, the causer does not necessarily exert a force on the 
causee, but rather removes an impediment – whether that be the causer itself or some 
other entity – to the causee’s desired action or state.  The distinction is illustrated by the 
following different depictions of a water-draining event: 
(8) a. The piston squeezing down (made the water drain/drained the water) from  
  the tank. 
 b. *The plug coming loose (made the water drain/drained the water) from the  
  tank. 
 c. The plug coming loose (let/allowed) the water (to) drain from the tank. 
         (Talmy 2000, 505) 
 
In (8a), an external device exerts a pressure on the patient (the water), which pushes it 
through the drain.  Since this is an example of effectuating causation (a strong antagonist 
acting on a weaker agonist), the make and the lexical causative patterns are appropriate.  
In (8b), however, the event of the plug coming loose does not represent the exertion of a 
                                                
11 See II.iii and II.iv below for some motivation, supporting evidence, and systematization of these 
intuitions. 
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force on the water, but rather the removal of a force (the seal) that was preventing the 
desired/intrinsic result of the patient (downward motion).  This satisfies the 
counterfactual definition of causation – the water would not have drained from the tank if 
not for the loosening of the plug – but introduces an additional participant that the causer 
must act on to bring about the result state. 
 In the case of human causer and causee of enabling causation, the verbs let and 
allow represent an authority that removes an (often unstated and social) obstacle, which 
frees the causee to exercise her will.  These behaviors are reflected in the verbs’ use12: 
(9) a. “Let the meat rest 20 to 30 minutes after cooking to let the juices settle in  
the meat.”            (Washington Post 1990) 
 b. “Please let me stay.  I’ll behave.  No profanity.  I swear.”   (Esquire, 1998) 
 c. “I let my kids decorate their rooms any way they want.”  (Parenting, 1999) 
 
In (9a), there are two instances of let, each with an inanimate patient.  In each case, the 
complement of the verb describes the natural tendency of the patient – if undisturbed, 
meat will ‘rest’ and juices will ‘settle’ – so let seems to mean ‘remove (or don’t create) 
any obstacles.’  In (9b), the speaker is pleading for the addressee to remove what is likely 
a force, probably implied, toward his or her removal, and in (9c) a parent describes the 
removal or non-enforcement of what might otherwise be considered a normatively 
default rule governing child behavior.  In each case, the cause is an instance of removal 
of (or non-creation on the part of an authority to create) an impediment on – to use force-
dynamic terminology – the ‘agonist’s intrinsic force.’ 
                                                
12 All collocation data and example sentences where not otherwise cited are from the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), maintained by Mark Davies at Brigham Young University. 
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2.2 CAUSAL DISTINCTIONS AND NATURAL SEMANTIC METALANGUAGE 
 
 
Wierzbicka (1998) models the differences between the effectuating causative 
verbs have, get, make, and force in terms of short lists detailing the conditions and role 
bearer attitudes that she claims make each verb felicitous in context.  Her approach is 
lexically idiosyncratic and, in general, she rejects the notion that there exist a priori types 
of causation that are represented by the English periphrastic causatives (Wierzbicka 1998, 
117).  In this section, I posit some preliminary descriptive observations and provide 
corpus sentence examples to introduce and motivate her Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
approach to the particular verbs of interest here, beginning with causative have. 
The causative verb have, as in (7a) above, “She had him mail the letter,” seems to 
occur most felicitously with animate, agentive patients.  In the cases for which it does 
not, as for sentences containing passive participles like “he had his car fixed,” an 
unexpressed agent who did the action leading to the state expressed is understood.  The 
verb does not select for an animate or animate-like patient if it is conceived as non-
agentive or somehow unwilling.  For example, “?She had the cat drink the milk,” or 
“??He had the washing machine wash the clothes.”  Wierzbicka recognizes this feature of 
causative have and claims that use of the verb suggests a hierarchical relationship, but not 
one in which the causer has unlimited power over the causee, but rather the causee is “a 
cooperative performer of the causer’s will” (Wierzbicka 1998, 121).  She represents the 
have predicate with the following scenario outline: 
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(10) Person X had Person Y do Z = 
 a. X wanted Z to happen (to W) 
 b. because of this X wanted Y to do Z (to W) 
 c. because of this, X said something to someone 
 d. because of this Y did Z 
 e. X could think that when X says something like this (about something  
  like this) Y can’t say: “I don’t want to do this”       (Wierzbicka 1998, 120) 
 
 The causative verb get, on the other hand, suggests cooperation of a less 
enthusiastic sort.  Like have, when get occurs with a human patient it signals compliance, 
but does not require that the patient be interested specifically in performing the causee’s 
will.  Similarly, there is no necessary power or authority that the causer has over the 
causee, rather the causer must do something that somehow influences the causee’s desires 
and behavior.  In general, the requirement that the causer simply wants the causee to do 
something is insufficient for get causation.  This is presumably the reason for the 
somewhat manipulative tone that often accompanies these constructions, as in a sentence 
like “he cleverly got the suspect to admit his involvement in the crime.”  Get can also 
take nonhuman complements, as in “I got the cat to drink the milk,” with the implication 
that the agent did something to make the animal want to, or otherwise be willing to, 
perform the desired action.  With get, the patient has the right of refusal and is operating 
according to its own will.  Sentences in the corpus are consistent with these intuitions, as 
the examples in (11) suggest: 
(11) a. “…that’s the best way to get them to come forward.”   (CNN – AM, 2006) 
 b. “…a number of us have been trying for years to get the government to  
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  recognize it.”               (PBS Newshour, 1990) 
 
 Wierzbicka represents the behavior of get as follows: 
 
(12) Person X got person Y to do Z = 
 a. X wanted Y to do Z 
 b. X knew that if Y didn’t want to do it Y would not do it 
 c. X thought that if Y wanted to do it Y would do it 
 d. because of this X did (said) something to Y 
 e. because of this after this Y wanted to do Z 
 f. because of this Y did Z 
 g. because of this X could think: “I wanted something to happen.  It  
  happened”     (Wierzbicka 1998, 124)  
 
The cases for which the patient is inanimate, as in “I got the car running,” or, to borrow 
Wierzbicka’s example, “I got the sauce to thicken” (1998, 123), likely represent a 
metaphoric extension of this scenario.  In most such cases, the patient, though inanimate, 
is conceived as having some volitional property, and in particular a stubbornness, which 
must be manipulated or overcome13.  This is reflected in the oddness of get when it occurs 
outside of a context of effort or resistance, as in context-neutral “I got the book open.”14 
                                                
13 A possible exception is the idiom “get the ball rolling,” for which resistance is not obvious.  Part of the 
meaning of this idiom plausibly relies on a relative difficulty of initiating some process, which would 
accord with the generalization given, but this is not straightforward. 
14 There is a usage of ‘get’ that occurs in sentences like “I just need to get my shoes on and I’ll be ready to 
go”.  These present a challenge for the generalization made here.  One possible analyses of these usages 
might claim that in sentences of this type something (a task) is preventing or delaying a desired outcome, 
which might then invest the task with a sort of figurative resistance and thereby make ‘get’ felicitous, but 
the details of such a proposal are not yet clear to me.  My thanks to Steve Wechsler for pointing out these 
constructions. 
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 There are several distinctive uses of the verb make, differing both in terms of verb 
complement and subject properties. Typical corpus sentences containing causative make 
and animate patients include the following: 
(13) a. “When they were far enough away not to make the strange horses  
  nervous…”15             (Analog, 2000) 
 b. “I wanted to make her feel better.”                    (US Catholic, 1998) 
 
Common to sentences of this type is the emotional or otherwise cognitive nature of the 
caused event or state.   For these make constructions, Wierzbicka offers the following 
explication: 
(14) Person X made person Y think/feel/want something = 
 a. X did something 
 b. because of this Y thought something 
 (b’ because if this Y felt something) 
 (b’’ because of this Y wanted something) 
 c. Y wouldn’t have thought/felt/wanted this if X had not done this 
(Wierzbicka 1998, 130-134) 
 
Another make causation construction type is that for which the verb ‘do’ or another 
action verb occurs in the complement clause: 
(15) a. “I’ll make you dig the most.”            (Bk: Salem Falls, 2002) 
 b. “It may make him pay for the actual harm caused by…”      
(EnvirAffairs, 1998) 
 
                                                
15 Although here the collocate ‘nervous’ is an adjective rather than a verb, and adjectival collocates were 
not collected for causative verbs in this study, the generalization that animate complements of make select 
for cognitive features, discussed below, seems to hold for this example.  In any case, I presume the relevant 
details are consistent with an elided verb ‘feel’ preceding the adjective. 
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For these sentences, which I will call ‘make do’ constructions, there is a coercive reading 
resulting from a power differential, which Wierzbicka represents as in (16): 
(16) Person X made person Y do Z = 
 a. X wanted Y to do Z 
 b. Y knew this 
 c. X knew that if X didn’t do something to Y, Y wouldn’t do I" 
 d. because of this X did (said) something to Y 
 e. because of this, Y thought “I have to do it” 
 f. because of this Y did Z 
 g. Y wouldn’t have done Z (at that time) if Y had not thought this   (ibid 136) 
 
For the ‘make do’ pattern, the right of refusal present in get is absent or diminished.  
Substitution of make in a sentence like “I tried to get him to do it, but he refused” – “?I 
tried to make him do it, but he refused” – is less felicitous.   
 The causer of a ‘make do’ construction need not be agentive.  Non-agentive 
causers occur in sentences like “the weather made us cancel the event” or “the noise 
made the guests leave.”  This kind of scenario is directly analogous to that depicted in 
(16), absent only the will of a causer: 
(17) Something (X) made person Y do Z = 
 a. person Y was in place P 
 b. something (X) happened in P (e.g. it started to rain) 
 c. because of this Y thought: “I have to do something” 
 d. because of this Y did Z (go inside) 
 e. Y wouldn’t have done Z if X had not happened  (ibid 138) 
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Finally, the object of a make periphrastic causative need not be animate.  The significant 
meaning component in these sentences is made salient when compared to lexical 
causatives: 
(18) a.  Henry shattered the window. 
 b.  Henry made the window shatter. 
 
(18b), in contrast with (18a), suggests a kind of indirect causation.  While (18a) could 
describe a scenario in which Henry punched and broke a window, (18b) would be 
inappropriate in such a context.  Make-do causatives of this kind are most felicitous when 
something happens due to some action, but nothing is done directly to the patient, with an 
oftentimes-unexpected result: 
 
(19) Person X made Z happen to thing Y (e.g., open, go off) 
 a. X did something 
 b. because of this something (Z) happened to thing Y 
 c. Z wouldn’t have happened to Y if X had not done this 
 d. X didn’t do anything to Y 
 e. because of this people could think that Z would not happen to Y 
(ibid 147) 
 
This, however, does not seem to be the whole story as concerns the make-do causative 
construction.  The causative is also felicitous when the means of causation are unknown 
or otherwise unexpressed: 
(20) “Who can make the disc soar highest, furthest, or longest?”     (ChildDigest, 1998) 
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Taken together, then, the periphrastic causative make requires the internal (if animate), 
indirect, or unspecified compulsion of a patient. 
 Force, finally, encodes direct compulsion.  The patient of a force causative is non-
cooperative, but has no right of refusal, and causation is typically direct.  In the case of 
inanimate patients, the distinction is again highlighted when compared to the lexical 
causative: 
(21) a.  Bill opened the door. 
 b.  Bill forced the door open. 
 
In (21b), there is an implication of resistance that is not present for (21a): “#Bill forced 
the door, which easily relented, open.”  The pattern is extended for animate patients, for 
whom the resistance is often internal – emotional or cognitive.   
(22) a. “…dry leaves will inevitably lead to huge fires, forcing displacement of  
  deer, elk, and upland birds…”      (FieldStream, 2007) 
 b. “…a new military campaign to force Muslims from their homes and  
  villages…”                           (ABC_Jennings, 1993) 
 c. “The court forced the district to integrate.”               (DenverNews, 2010) 
 
The resistance of the causee and the control of the causer are likewise represented in 
Wierzbicka’s explication: 
(23) Person X forced person Y to do Z (e.g. to apologize). = 
 a. X wanted Y to do Z 
 b. X knew that Y didn’t want to do Z 
 c. X thought that if X did something to Y, Y would have to do Z 
 d. because of this X did something to Y 
 e. because of this Y had to do Z 
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 f. because of this Y did Z 
 g. Y wouldn’t have done Z if X had not done this to Y 
 h. when Y was doing Z, Y thought: “I don’t want to do this” 
(ibid 141) 
 
In the following sections, the approaches of Talmy and Wierzbicka to causation in 
English periphrastic verbs will be compared to corpus collocation data and ultimately 
rejected in favor of a somewhat hybridized view.  
 
2.3  CAUSATIVES IN THE COCA 
 
 
 To collect data bearing on the selection biases of periphrastic causatives and verbs 
of becoming, I performed a search of right collocates of the verbs in the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA).  The COCA is a 450 million word balanced 
corpus, equally divided among spoken, fiction, popular magazines, news texts, and 
academic publications, as well as by year for each year from 1990-2012 
(http://corpus.byu.edu/ coca/).  The data presented here were obtained by searching for 
verb lemmas following ‘X me|him|it (to)’ for causative verbs or adjective lemmas 
immediately following the verbs of becoming.  For each verb, the five most frequent verb 
lemmas were added to a list (the horizontal x-axis in the graphs below), and the 
frequencies for each member of that list were collected for each causative or inchoative 
verb, allowing for a stable comparison set of collocates for the verbs of interest.  The 
vertical y-axes of the graphs represent the frequency of occurrence for each word on the 
x-axis as a percentage of all words of that part of speech (in this case, lemmatized verbs) 
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occurring in that environment.  The results of this procedure for the causative verbs are 
presented in this subsection.   
 As discussed in section 2.2 above, causative get suggests patient cooperation that 
is somewhat more resistant than that of patients of causative have16.  Get with an animate 
patient requires that the causer do something to influence the causee’s will, but she has no 
direct authority or power.  The patient has the right to refuse the agent’s desires, as 
suggested by the sentences in (11), repeated here as (24): 
(24) a. “…that’s the best way to get them to come forward.”   (CNN – AM, 2006) 
 b. “…a number of us have been trying for years to get the government to  
  recognize it.”               (PBS Newshour, 1990) 
Also suggestive is the distribution of verbs that appear in the complements of get: 
 
 
Figure 1: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of get. 
                                                
16 Rampant polysemy makes corpus data collection for causative have infeasible.  However, I hope that the 
stereotypical employee/employer relationship that is evoked by sentences like “she had him fax the letter,” 
which seems to combine a cooperative patient with a possible power differential, makes the relevant 
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The most frequent verbs, such as work, do, talk, stop, come, and go, all require the 
volition of the subject when it is animate, whereas non-volitional verbs like seem, know, 
and feel are comparatively rare.  While someone can refuse to do something, she cannot 
similarly refuse to know something.  This supports the claim made in the previous section 
that get causation with an animate patient involves influencing the patient’s will, which 
appears to be a fundamental feature of the meaning of causative get. 
 The periphrastic causative make, in contrast to get, commonly occurs with verbs 
of emotion and cognition: 
 
 
Figure 2: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
make. 
 
The most common verb in a complement clause of make is feel.  Feeling, like thinking 











































































Make	  NP	  VP	  
 21 
cognitive state that is potentially unwilled.  Like get, then, the collocation frequencies are 
consistent with the claim that make is sensitive to the degree of volitional control that the 
patient can exercise over the event described. 
 Force, as argued in 2.2, denotes direct causation acting on a non-cooperative 
patient.  Since direct, coercive causation requires volitional control from without, verbs in 
complement clauses representing cognitive or emotional states, like feel and think, are 




Figure 3: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
force. 
 
As described in 2.1, the effectuating causatives like get, make, and force differ 
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removal of an obstacle and so the causer does not oppose the will or tendency of the 
causee.  But let and allow also seem to have an extended meaning rooted in politeness.  It 
appears that these verbs signal respect by suggesting that the addressee has the social 
authority or status to impede the activity denoted by the complement clause.  This might 
be the source of expressions like ‘let me ask,’ which is typically followed immediately by 
the question the speaker intended to pose: 
(25) a. “All right, let me go back to the question of the budget…”   
                             (ABC_Brinkley, 1996) 
 b. “Let me bring you back in this conversation”           (NPR_Saturday, 2002) 
 c. “Let me just touch on the rest of the story”        (NPR_TalkNation, 2007) 
 
There is also a metaphoric construction involving knowledge, in which the addressee is 
expected to have some information and the speaker asks her to abstain from withholding 
it by requesting of her to ‘let me know:’ 
(26)  “I tried to let him know how important he was.”       (SportingNews, 2009)  
 
These constructions are so common, in fact, that they are dominantly represented in the 




Figure 4: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of let. 
 
There is yet another type of causation encoded by an English periphrastic 
causative not yet discussed to this point.  This type combines both an initial effectuation 
followed by a kind of self-agency on the part of the patient.  It is expressed by the verb 
set as it occurs in the following kinds of sentences: 
(27) a.  Bob set the bird free. 
 b.  Bob set the log on fire. 
 c.  Bob set the alarm clock to go off at 6:00 am. 
 
Set, like make and force, requires some kind of direct action or effectuating force on the 
patient, but like let and allow, there is a subsequent kind of self-agency.  Although he 
does not identify set as encoding that causation type, Talmy does characterize the notion 
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(28) a. I slid the box across the ice by pushing on it (steadily). 
 b. I slid the box across the ice by giving it a push.     (Talmy 2000, 498) 
 
The difference in interpretation between (28a) and (28b) is in the relative mapping of 
causing event and resulting event.  In (28a), the box moving across the ice is “the 
ongoing result of an extended force impingement without which it would stop,” (Talmy 
2000, 498), while in (28b), the motion following the initial push is conceived as 
autonomous and requiring no further force.  Interestingly, events of this type are often 
described as ‘setting (something) in motion,’ which reflects the unique causative profile 
of set.  The combination of effectuating onset causation and subsequent self-agency can 
be seen in the sentences below: 
(29) a. “She set him to grazing on clover”        (Bk:ColdMountain, 1997) 
b. “…pathways that are set into motion by the consumption of abused 
drugs…”           (DrugIssues, 2009) 
 c. “…other houses and barns were set on fire”               (SocialHistory, 1993) 
 
In (29a), after an initial (here, perhaps enabling) causative event, the will of the patient 
sustains the event denoted by the complement clause.  In (29b), certain neural pathways, 
once activated, remain active independent of further external influence, and in (29c), the 
‘set on fire’ phrase describes a situation of an initiating act that is followed by self-
sustaining activity – the burning of the fire.  The sentence (29c), in which someone sets a 
device to do something at a later time, demonstrates how this initiation plus self-agentive 
causative scenario can be conceptualized for complex artifacts. 
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 In the corpus sentences, almost all verbs appearing in the complements of the set 
causatives are activity verbs: work, go, etc.  This tendency is consistent with the 
characterization that set is a direct but also enabling causative of a self-directed activity, 
and their relatively restricted set of collocate verbs is intriguing, if not yet entirely clear, 
in its own right: 
 
 
Figure 5: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of set. 
 
Finally, drive denotes an extended effectuating causation that is coextensive with 
the path leading to the result state.  For most sentences containing the periphrastic 
causative drive, the interpretation is the extended application of a (usually unpleasant, see 
section III) force resulting in an adverse reaction or state: 
(30) a. “The smoke drove the squirrel from its tree.”     (Talmy 2000, 540) 
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 c. “…your incessant barking is driving me crazy.”  (NPR_TalkNation, 2009) 
 d. “Lucifer was driven away from heavenly paradise.”17 
        (Scandanavian Studies, 1998) 
 
Like set, drive is relatively restricted in its collocation patterns, but in addition to physical 
activity verbs, also co-occurs with cognitive, perceptual, and emotional verbs, such as 
see, try, and think: 
 
 
Figure 6: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
drive. 
 
There are two overarching and interdependent parameters that distinguish the 
causatives examined in this and previous sections.  These parameters, described in the 
                                                
17 Here, as in (13), the example collocates are of different grammatical categories than the data that was 
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following subsection, involve the interaction of desires and intentions of causer and 
causee.   Contra Wierzbicka, then, types of causation as modeled by interactions of 
opposing forces are independent of, and identifiable in, English periphrastic causatives.  
Contra Talmy, these oppositions are insufficient characterizations of causation as 
expressed by these verbs.  The remainder of the paper will be, in part, an elaboration of 
the latter point. 
 
2.4 SUMMARY: CAUSAL PROXIMITY AND PATIENT COMPLICITY 
 
 
The periphrastic causatives can be distinguished along two related parameters.  
The first parameter I will call ‘causal proximity,’ which is a generalized measure of how 
direct the causation is.  For example, to force is to do something directly to a resistant 
patient to arrive at an effect.  To make, while still involving a resistant patient in the case 
of human participants, requires only the exercise of authority, but not direct intervention.  
For inanimate patients, the distinction in causal proximity between force and make is 
clear from the intuition that in the sentences “he made/forced the door open,” only the 
former can describe the event of pushing a button in a remote location. 
The second causative parameter is patient complicity, which is a measure of how 
resistant or cooperative the patient is to the caused event.  The two measures are not 
unrelated, since a very resistant patient will require a very proximate causal action to 
effect a result, but the difference between have and get is illustrative of the distinction.  
While both have and get represent a relatively indirect causative scenario involving 
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relatively compliant patients, for have the patient is a “cooperative performer of the 
causer’s will,” while for get, the patient is only cooperative insofar as his/her/its ‘will’ is 
influenced.  Despite this distinction, the relative rankings for the causatives examined 
here are, with one exception, equivalent, with causal distance aligning with patient 
complicity.  The exception is the verb set, for which causation is proximate, but the 
patient is complicit.  The complex, two-part, effectuating plus self-sustaining nature of 
the species of causation that set denotes, however, makes this verb somewhat 
exceptional.  A proposal for the patient complicity hierarchy, which I take to be primary, 
is given in figure 7 below:   
 
Figure 7: Patient Complicity hierarchy for selected English periphrastic causatives. 
 
The following section extends the search for distinctions among these verbs to the 
question of how a speaker’s attitude toward a subevent or state influences the choice of a 









 Sentiment plays a role in the meaning of both periphrastic causatives and the 
‘verbs of becoming’ – simple change of state verbs like become, get, fall (asleep), come 
(loose), go (crazy), turn (sour), and grow (tired)18.  In particular, the choice of a particular 
causative or simple change of state verb seems to be influenced in part by the speaker’s 
evaluative stance toward the complement clause or result state.  The verb cause, for 
example, is best with negative outcomes: 
 
(31) a.     Who caused this horrible disaster? 
 b.                 ??Who caused this delightful surprise? 
 
 
To explore whether particular verbs favor positive or negative complements, in this 
section I apply intuitions regarding evaluative polarity along with a social-media derived 
measure of sentiment to adjective collocates in corpus sentences and compare those 
results to binary ‘good/bad’ collocation preferences as reflected by Google’s n-gram 
resource19. 
                                                
18 I assume an interval semantics that is common across the verbs of becoming by virtue of encoding 
changes of state.  In particular, the following discussion is compatible with Dowty’s “[BECOME φ] is true 
at I iff (1) there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I such that ¬φ is true at J, (2) there is an 
interval K containing the final bound of I such that φ is true at K, and (3) there is no non-empty interval I’ 
such that I’ ⊂ I and conditions (1) and (2) hold for I’ as well as I.”  (Dowty  1979, 141).  What follows is 
intended to build on this common event structure. 
19 http://books.google.com/ngrams.  Note that, Although Google’s n-gram measures word-sequence 
frequencies in books published in English for the last 200 years, to militate against large diachronic 
changes in meaning, all measures that follow encompass only those books published between 1950 and 
2000. 
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3.1 SENTIMENT AND SELECTION 
 
 
 Much work has been done and many technological advances made in recent years 
in the area of sentiment analysis.  Machine learning and data mining techniques, in 
particular, have yielded powerful computational resources for the automatic classification 
of author sentiment in various domains (see e.g. Pang et al. 2002, Pang & Lee 2008, 
Hatzivassiloglou & McKeown 1997, Kennedy & Inkpen 2006, Blair-Goldensohn et al. 
2008).  In what follows, however, a somewhat naïve approach to sentiment classification 
is employed, in which the relative frequencies of right adjacent evaluative adjectives 
(‘good’ and ‘bad’) are compared for the verbs of interest as a means of gauging whether 
certain verbs have evaluative connotations as reflected solely by their selectional 
properties. 
 As mentioned above, the verb cause appears to carry a negative connotation that 
might be unexpected based on its neutral term of art status in disciplines like philosophy 
and physical science, as well as its use as the name for the semantic primitive in lexical 
decompositional theories.  This tendency is nevertheless reflected in the corpus 
sentences: 
 
(32) a. “…assess the damage caused by the burning oil wells.”   
         (ABC_Nightline, 1991)  
b. “…changes of job and heart had caused some wear and tear on the  
  relationships.”                (Bk: Romantics, 2008) 
 c. “The things you didn’t do are likely to cause the most regret.” 
               (Prevention, 2006) 
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d. “Divorce caused tumult, but didn’t make a lasting impression, good or 
bad.”        (USA Today, 2002) 
 
 
In (32a), cause is used with a state of physical damage and is contrastive with a sentence 
such as “??...assess the repairs/improvements caused by the workers,” in which a positive 
sentence is no longer felicitous with the verb.  In (32b), the physical damage scenario is 
extended metaphorically to relationship health, and in (32c) cause introduces a negative 
emotional state.  (32d) is interesting in that it contains both the cause and make causative 
verbs, showing the contrast between the negative ‘tumult’ complement of the former with 
the neutral complement of make, ‘lasting impression,’ which is explicitly identified as 
non-evaluative via a direct denial that it is either good or bad. 
 When used in some contexts, cause can occur with sentiment-neutral 
complements, as the sentences in (33) demonstrate: 
 
(33) a. “Humidity causes it to curl and turn back.”             (Atlanta, 2009) 
b. “…ultrahigh-frequency sound waves could be used to cause air to bend 
light.”          (TechReview, 2002) 
 c. “Oxidation, the same chemical reaction that causes sliced apples to turn  
  brown.”20         (MensHealth, 1994) 
 
 
These sentences all involve physical causation without negative connotations.  Each 
provides a physically descriptive, non-evaluative context for which cause seems to have a 
                                                
20 The evaluative status of turn is explored below. 
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specialized neutral meaning.  The frequent verbal collocates of the verb across all COCA 
contexts, however, include negative terms like lose, miss, and fall:  
 
 
Figure 8: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
cause. 
 
And in published books the verb occurs more frequently with the clearly negative 
adjective bad than the clearly positive good21: 
 
                                                
21 Note that here, as elsewhere, Google N-grams evaluates only sequences of words, and not hierarchical 
syntactic structure reflecting constituency.  Most of the ‘caused good/bad’ tokens likely are the verb with 
the adjectival modifier of some noun phrase that is not included.  One example, from a book published in 





















































































Figure 9: frequency of ‘caused good’ and ‘caused bad’ in Google’s collection of 
published books 1950-2000. 
 
One verb for which evaluative status is not robust despite plausible expectations 
to the contrary is the change of state verb grow.  According to expectations – in any case, 
my expectations – grow represents a converse of cause.  In spite of the ‘good is up, bad is 
down’ conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 16) and “bigger is better” cultural 
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values, however, there doesn’t seem to be any clear evaluative polarity reflected in the 
verb’s adjectival complements22: 
 
 
Figure 10: distribution of representative adjectival complements of grow. 
 
To employ a more objective – if somewhat crude – measure of sentiment, I obtained a 
‘positivity measure’ for each adjective by dividing the co-occurrence of the word in 
question and positive emoticons ( ‘:)’ and its variants) by co-occurrence with negative 
emoticons ( :(-forms) in Twitter data as aggregated by the site topsy.com.  Although the 
                                                
22 In fact, according to Google N-grams, “grew ill” is more frequent than “grew healthy” in published 











































































































































results do contain anomalies (including the placement of crazy, discussed below), it 
provides an extra-intuitional measure of sentiment.  Indeed, the apparent lack of 
evaluative selection for grow is more clearly reflected by the relatively even distribution 




Figure 11: sentiment-adjusted distribution of representative adjectival complements of 
grow. 
 
Based on these data, a characteristic of grow more striking than its sentiment selection is 





















































































































within this class, better and worse are both relatively common.  Collocation frequencies 
with good and bad are practically equivalent23: 
 
Figure 12: frequency of ‘grew good’ and ‘grew bad’ in Google’s collection of published 
books 1950-2000. 
 
The verb turn selects for a couple of relatively semantically coherent complement classes 
that do not display evaluative polarity.  Color terms and affiliation categories (especially 
political or professional affiliation, like “turn pro”) are common adjectival complements 
of the verb of becoming: 
(34) a. “A yellow stain will appear or the paper will turn brown and brittle.” 
             (AmerArtist, 1998) 
 b. “…the bird icon turns red and chirps…”         (PC World, 2002) 
 c. “…their shaggy white bark turning pink and gold in the sinking sun.” 
             (OutdoorLife 2009) 
 
                                                
23 N-gram results for ‘grew better’ and ‘grew worse’ show a slightly higher frequency of the latter 




The ‘turn X into Y’ construction pattern also seems to be neutral with respect to 
evaluative polarity: 
 
(35) a. “…the ubiquity of cheats has turned clever competitors into couch  
potatoes.”      (AssocPress, 2007) 
 b. “…given them a reason to turn past mistakes into something positive.” 
          (Bk: IntoNight, 2011) 
 c. “The police turned political need into a mandate.” (RollingStone, 1993) 
 
While (35a) denotes a presumably negative event of ‘turning into,’ (35b) is explicitly 
postive, and for (35c) it is not clear whether there is any sentiment expressed one way or 
the other.  The most common adjectival complements of turn are dominated by color and 
affiliative category terms24: 
 
Figure 13: distribution of representative adjectival complements of turn. 
                                                










































































































































But adjectival complements of turn, when not a color or affiliative term or a part of a ‘X 
into Y’ structure, tend toward the negative side of the sentiment scale: 
(36) a. “They turned nasty against the U.N. Human Rights observers.” 
                   (NPR_America, 1993) 
 b. “…didn’t have a hundred breaths left before his blood turned sour and  
  choked him until he was blue.”     (FantasySciFi, 2006) 
 c. “At the movies, Westerns turned dark and cynical.”    (US_Catholic, 2011) 
 
The sentences in (36a) and (36b) clearly express negative sentiment as reflected by the 
use of the adjectives nasty and sour.  In (36c), movies becoming dark and cynical might 
be a good or bad thing depending on one’s taste in movies, but considering the source – a 
religious magazine – a presumably negative sentiment toward the development justifies 
the use of the verb turn.  Relative frequencies of ‘turned good’ and ‘turned bad’ on 
Google’s n-gram viewer bear the intuition out: 
 
Figure 14: frequency of ‘turned good’ and ‘turned bad’ in Google’s collection of 
published books 1950-2000. 
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The change of state verb come appears with a relatively restricted set of adjectival 
complements.  Among these, there are several collocates that are neutral with respect to 
sentiment, as in “come loose” and “come open,” meaning in each case a separation of 
contiguous material: 
(37) a. “It tells me that the door came open.”          (CBS_48 Hours, 1996) 
 b. “What if the wobbly slabs come loose?”  (BkSF:WestAlongWagon, 1998) 
 c. “D’s face was coming loose in long wet streaks” (SouthwestRev, 2002) 
 
Sentences (37a) and (37b) denote events of material division and (37c) denotes a 
figurative extension of the same, but none clearly indicates speaker sentiment.  This 
appears to be a coherent lexical semantic group of complements, including apart, open, 
loose, and free that, along with the locative sense of come, make up a neutral and 
restricted change of state class. 
 In addition to the locative and material separation change of state senses of come, 
however, there is a sense that selects for adjectival complements that do appear to have a 
bias toward positive sentiment.  Common phrases of this type include ‘come true,’ ‘come 
clean,’ and ‘come alive’:   
(38) a. “…all these stories about wishes that come true…” (Bk: CrissCross, 2006) 
 b. “Corporations trying to come clean by cooperating with the  
government…”     (ABA_Journal, 2004) 
c. “…this discovery comes closer than any other to proving, for the first 
time…”      (Bk: PastLives, 1999) 
 d. “…and as you can see, this is where it comes alive.” 
           (CBS_Morning, 1993) 
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When replaced by similar, negatively oriented adjectives, the phrases become 
infelicitous:  
(39) a. ??...wishes that come false. 
 b. ??...corporations trying to come deceptive/secretive. 
 c. ??...the discovery comes far from/to/(?toward) proving… 
 d. ??...this is where is comes dead/lifeless/unenergetic/boring. 
 
Google’s n-gram viewer confirms a higher frequency of ‘came good’ than ‘came bad’ in 
the published books of the latter half of the twentieth century: 
 
Figure 15: frequency of ‘came good’ and ‘came bad’ in Google’s collection of published 
books 1950-2000. 
 
Like come, the verb go occurs in certain constructions for which speaker 
sentiment is neutral or even positive insofar as the subject is agentive and the go change 
of state represents an intentional act: 
 
(40) a. “Even when a company goes public in Canada…”`     (CanadaLaw, 1999) 
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b. “Environmentalist Elizabeth Rogers makes going green almost 
effortless…”                (HarpersBazaar, 2010) 
 c. “Go glam.  Lay out the pipe cleaners, fabric scraps…”     (Parenting, 1999) 
 
Outside of these intentional go change of state usages, however, complements of the verb 
are surprisingly productive and overwhelmingly negative: 
 
(41) a. “Belly’s face goes sick and uncertain.”    (FantasySciFi, 2010) 
 b. “I’ve gone gray as a result of this war.”             (Denver, 1999) 
 c. “1,000 homicides in the first half of the decade went unsolved because no  
  one stepped forward.”                             (TIME, 1999) 
 d. “The U.S. corn industry would go mad if congress threatened to erase  
sugar protection.”              (ConsumResrch, 1995) 
 e. “I caught her, and she went limp in my arms.”           (Essence, 1992) 
 f. “I don’t mean to go ballistic or anything…”      (Bk: UntilEndTime, 1995) 
 g. “…like trying to explain why some marriages go sour while others  
blossom.”         (OutdoorLife, 2005) 
 h. “We all hear it if things go bad…”            (Chicago, 2007) 
 i. “And he has gone negative.”            (CNN_Situation, 2006) 
 
The verb also selects for states representing the cessation of some activity, vitality, or 
energy source: 
(42) a.  The crowd went quiet. 
 b.  The lights went dim. 
 c.  The food went stale. 
 
The sentences in (42) – with the possible exception of (42c) – are not clearly negative in 
terms of sentiment, but they are negative or marked in terms of default state or expected 
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values, which may be the root of the negative sentiment extension of go.  The evaluative 
polarity of the latter sense is consistent with and reinforced by the stark difference in 
relative frequencies of go with negative versus positive adjectival collocates: 
 
 
Figure 16: frequency of ‘went good’ and ‘went bad’ in Google’s collection of published 
books 1950-2000. 
 
The conclusions from the findings regarding the evaluative status of the verbs examined 
in this section is aggregated in the table below: 
 
Negative	   Neutral	   Positive	  
Cause,	  Turn,	  Go	   Grow	   Come	  
Table 1: Evaluative status of select periphrastic causatives and verbs of becoming in 
English 
 43 
A possible explanation for the evaluative polarity of verbs like come and go, in 
particular, is the inherent directionality of their basic meanings with respect to the 
speaker.  In their core directional senses, come is deictically oriented toward the speaker, 
while go points away from the speaker: 
(43) a.  Come here/*away 
 b.  Go *here/away 
 
The following subsection examines locative deixis more closely as a metaphor for, and a 
general influence on, sentiment in language in general, and in the English periphrastic 
causatives and verbs of becoming in particular. 
 
3.2 SENTIMENT, EMPATHY, AND DEIXIS 
 
  
 Closely related to sentiment is the social meaning component of empathy.  
Empathy refers here to point of view alignment and emotional self-identification with 
some participant or position represented or expressed in speech.  As self-identification, 
empathy can be thought of as a proxy for sentiment insofar as one’s sentiments are 
typically aligned with one’s social or emotional fellows.  For this reason, there is often a 
direct relationship between the two parameters.  In particular, sentiment often tracks 
empathy and, it seems, empathy tracks deixis.  The deictic status of the verbs in question 
therefore has consequences for interpretation and selectional behavior. 
In her study of impersonal uses of person pronouns, Zobel (2011) describes the 
tendency for indefinite uses of definite pronouns in German and related languages to 
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signal emotional focus or involvement of the speaker.  Following an early version of 
Malamud (2012), she calls the phenomenon “empathy tracking” and illustrates its 
robustness by pointing out the difference in interpretation for English sentences like the 
following: 
(44) a. They used to throw you in jail for that. 
 b. You used to throw them in jail for that. 
         (adapted from Zobel 2011, 10, attributed to Malamud) 
 
In (44a), the speaker expresses emotional alignment or point of view commonality with 
the object of the jailing, while in (44b) her empathy is with the subject.  In these 
sentences, emotional identification is signaled by the second person pronoun.  Insofar as 
empathy is signaled by shared point of view or common reference as indicated by 
pointing or self-referential elements of meaning, it is a potential component of the 
meaning of deixis in general and deictic verbs in particular. 
As it relates to the verbs of becoming and their meanings, deixis bridges the 
notions of sentiment and distance.  As has been elsewhere observed (see Cullicover and 
Dellert 2008 for a recent study) deictic verbs, when used in an otherwise semantically 
neutral construction, often reveal an emotional orientation toward certain notions and 
states.  Perhaps the clearest example of this tendency is seen in the behavior of the verb 
go in English when used in the kinds of constructions discussed in section 3.1 above.   Go 
as ‘become’ is most felicitous when used with adjectival predicates that signal a kind of 
deterioration or other state that the speaker is likely to dis-identify with, or perhaps 
implicitly to deny or disavow responsibility for: 
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 (45) a. The milk went bad/sour/rotten/*good/*sweet. 
 b. John went crazy/insane/postal/*intelligent/*likable. 
 
Come, while more restricted than go, often signals a positive change of some kind when 
used to mean ‘become,’ as illustrated in the idioms “he came around,” and “she came 
clean.”  Although stable with respect to point of view, these verbs differ in meaning 
based on directionality.   
In its core directional sense, come encodes motion toward the speaker, as 
illustrated in (43).  A possible interpretation of this in terms of the empathy-as-deixis 
hypothesis is that the verb, as deictically oriented toward the speaker, favors 
complements with which the speaker is eager or willing to identify.  The verb, as 
speaker-centered and proximate, thereby suggests closeness and self-identification and, 
consistent with the N-gram data in Figure 15, it tends to occur with positive evaluative 
collocates: 
 










































































































































Ignoring the anomalous ranking of some collocates (true is, for some reason, ranked 
more negatively than silent, old, and flat), come is more heavily represented on the left 
(positive) side of the sentiment-ranked graph: 
 
 
Figure 18: sentiment-adjusted distribution of representative adjectival complements of 
come. 
 
Conversely, the core sense of go is speaker-centered and distally directed:   
(46)   Go ??here/away. 
 
And, when used in the simple change of state sense, it occurs more felicitously with 
negative (right) adjectival complements than with positive (left) ones, with the obviously 


























































































































Figure 19: sentiment-adjusted distribution of representative adjectival complements of 
go.  
 
Outside of adjectives like right and far, which are collocates of the directional-movement 
sense, and public, which occurs with the intentional agentive act of becoming as 
discussed in 3.1, the most common adjectival complements of go include crazy and bad, 
both very clearly negatively oriented adjectives25, reinforcing the N-gram trends 
illustrated in figure 16. 
 At least one English periphrastic causative appears to reflect empathetic meaning 
via deixis: the verb drive.  As noted in chapter 2, drive occurs most frequently with 
activity verbs, few of which are clearly negative or positive in evaluative orientation: 
                                                
25  The relevant sense of ‘crazy’ is assumed to be non-controversially negative even while the adjective, 
according to this metric, is unexpectedly deemed positive by Twitter-users.  This probably represents the 
























































































































Figure 20: distribution of representative verbs occurring in the complement clause of 
drive. 
 
When the complement clause contains a result state, however, the adjective is almost 
exclusively restricted to crazy and its synonyms26: 
(47) a. “The one thing that really drove me crazy about her…”   
                 (Bk:WalkToRemember, 2000) 
 b. “When hunger and thirst threatened to drive him mad…”    (Analog, 1998) 
 c. “It drove him batty.”            (SportsIllustrated, 2005) 
 d. “You drive me insane.”         (Bk:TwoLittleLies, 2005) 
 
An exception to this overwhelming tendency is the collocate away: 
(48) a. “…and, of course, you drive him further away…”   (CNN_Sonya, 1992) 
                                                















































































Drive	  NP	  to	  VP	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 b. “Roman Polanski talks to Diane Sawyer about the scandal that drove him  
  away.”             (ABC_Primetime, 1994) 
 
This reflects the deictic status of the causative drive, which is oriented away from the 
speaker.  Consequently – although the comparison is potentially problematic – the verb 
occurs with away much more frequently than it does with here: 
 
 
Figure 21: frequency of ‘went good’ and ‘went bad’ in Google’s collection of published 
books 1950-2000. 
 
This deictic status might be the reason that, like go, drive occurs with crazy and, in 
general, seems to be more felicitous with negatively oriented complements than with 
positively oriented ones27: 
(49) a. It drove him crazy/*sane/*likable/*enthusiastic. 
 b. It drove him to depression/*to hope/*to joy. 
                                                
27 A subsequent reversal of influence may be responsible for the deictically anomalous “drove him 
inward.” 
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 c. It drove him to drink/?to sobriety. 
 
Despite these tendencies, it is not entirely clear whether deictic status is predictive of 
evaluative polarity, only that, for these verbs, it tends to correlate.  Given the behavior 
discussed here, however, it is suggestive that in some varieties of English the counterpart 
for drive in constructions like “X him mad” is the similarly outward-directed speaker-
centered deictic verb send.  In addition to German (Zobel 2011), empathy tracking of 
deictic terms has been observed in Japanese (Oshima 2007b) and the American languages 
Cree and Navajo (Oshima 2007a), further supporting empathy as a cross-linguistic 
feature of deixis.   Although they are not explored here, the figurative behavior of verbs 
like push and bring (joy, pain) could help with further untangling whether speaker 
sentiment and empathy tracking via deictic orientation is a general tendency among 










Chapter 4:  Register     
 
 
Several of the verbs of becoming and causing examined here differ with respect to 
formality in context of use.  This kind of variation is something that speakers of a 
language often have very clear intuitions about, even if they are unable to precisely 
characterize it.  An English speaker knows, for example, that a different type of speech is 
called for when making a professional presentation to a group of strangers than when 
making plans for dinner with a loved one.  Similarly, a text message to a friend obeys 
different rules than an email or letter to an employer.  The aggregate of these differences 
is what will be referred to here as ‘register.’ 
 In the sociolinguistic tradition, ‘register’ sometimes refers to a more general 
phenomenon that might be more intuitively described as ‘style,’ and, in fact, the two 
terms are often interchangeable in the literature (see Gregory 1967, 194 for a discussion 
of the terminological confusion).  The relevant scale for the present purposes is that of 
formality, which interacts with both the field of discourse and the mode of 
communication, among potentially other criteria, to make up the larger phenomenon of 
linguistic style.  This “formal” versus “informal” distinction is sometimes called ‘tenor’ 
by sociolinguists.   
The question of what constitutes register intuitions, as well as that of what kinds 
of linguistic cues track formality, is not yet clearly understood.  This section is an 
abbreviated and mostly suggestive snapshot of intuitive register distinctions, collocation 
patterns, and n-gram comparisons of a small sampling of the change of state and 
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periphrastic causative English verbs, pointing to yet another kind of meaning distinction 
that these verbs are sensitive to and propaedeutic to a more complete treatment. 
 
4.1  ‘GET’ AND ‘BECOME’ 
 
 
The verbs get and become seem, at first blush, to encode little beyond an inchoative 
change of state.  Even on a strictly intuitive level, however, the verbs differentially favor 
arguments based not necessarily on the state being described, but the choice of word used 
to describe the state: 
(50) a.  John got wasted 
 b.           ??John became wasted 
 c.  John became intoxicated 
 d.           ??John got intoxicated 
 
(51) a.  John got mad 
 b.  John became angry/?mad 
 
In (50) and (51), the degree of felicity appears to correspond to the degree to which the 
registers evoked by the verb and adjective correspond28. 
 Get appears to favor words that signal an informal register, while become is 
reserved for more formal speech.  When these verbs occur with adjectives that evoke the 
opposite pole of the formality scale, various degrees of register clash result.  Figure 22 
                                                
28 Another feature for which ‘get’ and ‘become’ differ is that of agent volition.  ‘Get,’ but not ‘become,’ 
suggests that the change of state was an intentional – or at least cooperative – one for certain sentences 
containing animate subjects.  This difference is illustrated by the sentence “John got married” when 
compared to the much less likely and pragmatically unusual “John became married.”  How and whether 
volition and register interact, however, is unclear to me.   
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illustrates this phenomenon by means of Google’s n-gram viewer, which here displays 
frequency over a larger time scale than has been used here in the previous uses of this 
tool for frequency information: 
 
 
Fig. 22: register clash and meaning divergence – left: ‘get sick’ vs. ‘get ill;’ right: 
‘become ill’ vs. ‘become sick.  
 
Although the judgments about register for sick and ill are themselves based only on 
personal intuition and are therefore only suggestive, if these adjectives do differ in terms 
of formality, the graphs in figure 22 suggest a divergence over time in acceptability for 
these verbs and register clashing adjectives.  One possible explanation for these data is in 
terms of evolving lexical pragmatics (see, e.g., Wilson & Carston 2007), with a historical 
lexical narrowing as linguistic register becomes an increasingly grammatically relevant 
aspect of meaning for the two verbs and they semantically drift apart along that 
dimension.   
Frequency data for a larger group of arguments drawn from the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English are consistent with the a general register distinction, 
beyond these verbs’ behavior with sick and ill.  For example, while become is common 
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with Latinate words like involved and apparent, get occurs more often with Germanic 
words like used, worse, and green.  This Latinate-Germanic distinction has indeed been 
elsewhere proposed as a marker of register differentiation (Bar-Ilan & Berman 2007).  
The selectional preferences are mostly consistent with respect to this distinction: 
 
 
Fig. 23: Collocation frequencies for become and get. 
 
Except for aware and better, all of the most common complements of become are of 
















































































































































4.2  ‘LET’ AND ‘ALLOW’ 
 
 
Let and allow are neither as clearly semantically primitive as get and become, nor 
are their collocation results as straightforward.  It is clear that let and allow are not light 
causative verbs in the same sense of cause and make, for example.  One important 
difference previously mentioned is that, for let and allow, the “caused” subevent is 
cancelable.  As detailed in chapter 2, let and allow also encode a kind of facilitation, or 
removal of obstacle that places the subject of these verbs at a greater remove in the causal 
chain.  Nevertheless, these verbs, like get and become, seem to bias their arguments in 
terms of register. 
 Again, this claim relies on native intuitions about the register difference between 
possible arguments, which is as yet without empirical support.  However, the Latinate – 
Germanic distinction is maintained for enter and come in,29 so if that distinction is indeed 
a tracker of formality and enter is associated with a more formal register than come in, 
Google’s N-gram viewer shows some suggestive trends: 
                                                
29 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘enter’ is from the French ‘entrer,’ while ‘come’ was Old 
English ‘cuman’ from a common German strong verb. 
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Fig. 24: let/allow come in/enter collocation 
 
The top two graphs in figure 24 show frequency over time of let and allow, and 
enter and come in, respectively.  Based on these frequencies, it might be expected that 
‘let him enter’ should be significantly more common than either ‘let him come in’ or 
allow with either argument.  An interesting result is reflected in the bottom two graphs, 
however.  Although let with either come in or enter is more common than either of the 
allow combinations, the frequency counts for ‘let him enter’ versus ‘allow him to enter’ 
are much closer than might be expected from the comparatively large differences in 
frequency between ‘let him come in’ and ‘allow him to come in.’ 
 One possible explanation for these trends is that, while let is not incompatible 
with formal register, allow is infelicitous in an informal context.  The may be a stable 
state in itself or it may perhaps represent some preliminary stage of a divergent semantic 
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drift.  In either case allow emerges as a lexically narrowed expression of the general let-
type facilitative causative with the added semantic feature of formal register.  This 
difference, in conjunction with that between get and become, suggests that formality is at 
least in some cases lexically differentiated in the English verbal lexicon, and that it 
consequently represents a further element of word meaning not represented in current 
















Chapter 5:  Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
 The proposed hierarchy of patient complicity for the English periphrastic 
causatives is repeated in figure 25, and the status with respect to sentiment and register of 
the causatives and verbs of becoming that have been the subject of this examination is 
summarized in table 2 below: 
 
Figure 25: Patient Complicity hierarchy for selected English periphrastic causatives. 
 
	   Sentiment	   Register	  
Let	   *	   informal(?)	  
Allow	   *	   formal	  
Cause	   negative	   *	  
Drive	   negative	   *	  
Become	   *	   formal	  
Get	   *	   informal	  
Turn	   negative	   *	  
Grow	   neutral	   *	  
Come	   positive	   *	  
Go	   negative	   *	  
Table 2: Summary of sentiment and register features for selected English verbs of 




The distinctions represented in Figure 25 and in Table 2 provide an explanation of 
the differences in selectional properties that were illustrated in (5), which is repeated 
below as (52): 
(52) a. It became apparent  a’. *It got apparent 
 b. John got taller   b’. *John came taller 
 c. It came true   c’. *It went true 
 e. He went nuts   e’. ?He became nuts 
 f. It got John interested  f’. *It drove John interested 
 g. It drove Sara crazy  g’. *It let Sara crazy 
 h. Mike let the car rust  h’. *Mike set the car (to) rust 
 i. He set the bird free  i’. ?He got the bird free 
 
 
Register harmony with the Latinate apparent accounts for the felicity of (52a) and the 
unacceptability of (52a’).  Sentiment selection via empathy rules out (52c’) while 
allowing sentences like (52c) and (52e).  Likewise, the sentiment preferences of drive 
explain the infelicity of (52f’) and the felicity of (52g), while the causally facilitative 
profile of let is compatible with a rusting event (52h), but strange with a going crazy 
event as commonly conceived (52g’).  Finally, the two-part causal initiation and self-
agentive process nature of set is appropriate for a removal of obstacle plus escape 
represented by freeing something animate (52i), while ‘get-free’ is only appropriate when 
it describes extraction from some stubborn restraint and does not include the suggestion 
 60 
of subsequent flight30 (52i’), which accords with the characterization of get in sections 2.2 
and 2.3. 
 Although the parameters and meaning components discussed here are not 
intended to comprise an exhaustive characterization of potential semantic-pragmatic 
differences among the English periphrastic causatives and verbs of becoming31, they 
represent elements of meaning that are outside of primitives and event scaffolding and 
that nonetheless have clear effects on selectional behavior.  These data present a 
challenge for proposals of lexical decompositions as sufficient models of verb meaning.  
Parallel considerations suggest that selection restrictions and biases are neither exhausted 
by common s-selection parameter inventories nor as idiosyncratic as might be suggested 
by meaning postulates.  Rather, verb meaning in English is influenced by a number of 
regular semantic, pragmatic, and social parameters – including those demonstrated here 
for our selection of semantically primitive verbs – that are likely to enter in varying 





                                                
30 To illustrate this point, note that the preferred reading of (57i’) is maintained when “the bird” is replaced 
with something inanimate, such as “the nail,” while such a replacement would make (57i) unacceptable. 
31 For example, additional relevant social meaning parameters might also include politeness, power or 
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